Complex, unseen networks often influence
decisions in various system platforms. These invisible networks allow powerful
external forces to subtly modify decision outcomes, even though system elements
might believe that transparent networks are solely responsible for shaping global
variables, such as the general rules and regulations governing these platforms
or social contexts.
For instance, the scenario is illustrated in
Figure 1. Four transparent groups (GA, GB, GC, GD) with identical members
appear to make decisions for System Platform Z. However, these decisions are influenced
by intricate, invisible group networks. Certain group members employ a secret
strategy to dominate the decision-making process, manipulating outcomes for
their benefit.
Specifically, two representatives from Group A
(Ea1 and Ea7) and two from Group B (Eb1 and Eb6) form an Invisible Network F.
Additionally, a representative from Group C (Ec4), two from Group D (Ed4 and
Ed7), and one from Group B (Eb4) establish a Visible Network H. Members from
Invisible Network F and Visible Network H then collaborate to create an even
more clandestine Invisible Network G, which in turn manipulates the
decision-making process within Groups A and B.
Meanwhile, the remaining members in Group A (Ea2,
Ea3, Ea4, Ea5, Ea8) and Group B (Eb2, Eb3, Eb4, Eb5, Eb7) are under the
impression that the decision-making process is designed to serve their
interests. However, external forces intervene, modifying the decision-making
protocol within the Invisible Network G.
Though invisible networks can integrate and exert
significant influence, the members often lack a holistic view of the decision-making
process. For example, the representatives Ec5 and Ec7 from Group C join forces
with representative Ea6 from Group A to form Invisible Network M. However, this
network struggles to impact the decision-making process within System Platform Z
due to insufficient support from other members within the invisible networks.
Observation:
According to the case study, members of Invisible
Networks often exhibit a strong ego and a competitive instinct. In contrast,
member group representatives tend to embody a more balanced Superego and a
cooperative instinct.
Observation:
Mutual benefits and shared interests can motivate
members to cooperate within the Invisible Political Network.
