Seizing Power Democratically through Invisible Political Networks

Complex, unseen networks often influence decisions in various system platforms. These invisible networks allow powerful external forces to subtly modify decision outcomes, even though system elements might believe that transparent networks are solely responsible for shaping global variables, such as the general rules and regulations governing these platforms or social contexts.

For instance, the scenario is illustrated in Figure 1. Four transparent groups (GA, GB, GC, GD) with identical members appear to make decisions for System Platform Z. However, these decisions are influenced by intricate, invisible group networks. Certain group members employ a secret strategy to dominate the decision-making process, manipulating outcomes for their benefit.

Specifically, two representatives from Group A (Ea1 and Ea7) and two from Group B (Eb1 and Eb6) form an Invisible Network F. Additionally, a representative from Group C (Ec4), two from Group D (Ed4 and Ed7), and one from Group B (Eb4) establish a Visible Network H. Members from Invisible Network F and Visible Network H then collaborate to create an even more clandestine Invisible Network G, which in turn manipulates the decision-making process within Groups A and B.

Meanwhile, the remaining members in Group A (Ea2, Ea3, Ea4, Ea5, Ea8) and Group B (Eb2, Eb3, Eb4, Eb5, Eb7) are under the impression that the decision-making process is designed to serve their interests. However, external forces intervene, modifying the decision-making protocol within the Invisible Network G.

Though invisible networks can integrate and exert significant influence, the members often lack a holistic view of the decision-making process. For example, the representatives Ec5 and Ec7 from Group C join forces with representative Ea6 from Group A to form Invisible Network M. However, this network struggles to impact the decision-making process within System Platform Z due to insufficient support from other members within the invisible networks.

 

                                                                    

 

Observation:

According to the case study, members of Invisible Networks often exhibit a strong ego and a competitive instinct. In contrast, member group representatives tend to embody a more balanced Superego and a cooperative instinct.

Observation:

Mutual benefits and shared interests can motivate members to cooperate within the Invisible Political Network.